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Judicial Protection under EU Law: Direct Actions
Armin Cuyvers
7.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the different direct actions under EU law.1 The term 
direct action indicates that these legal actions provide parties with a rem-
edy directly before the Court of Justice or the General Court. Only five direct 
actions exist under EU law, being the action for annulment, the action for inac-
tion, an action for damages against the EU, the infringement proceeding and 
the request for an advisory opinion from the CJEU. Most of these actions have 
a rather limited scope, or like the action for annulment are only open to a very 
limited category of applicants. The limited availability of direct actions fur-
ther emphasizes the point already made in chapter 2, namely the crucial role 
played by national courts in the interpretation and application of EU law.2 It 
also helps to explain the central importance of the preliminary reference pro-
cedure discussed in EU chapter 8.
7.2 The Action for Annulment
Article 263 TFEU allows certain applicants to bring an action for annul-
ment against all legal acts from EU institutions or other EU bodies, offices or 
agencies. An action for annulment, however, cannot be brought against EU pri-
mary law.3
1   For a more elaborate analysis on direct actions see amongst many others P. Craig and G. De 
Búrca, EU Law (6th edn, OUP 2015), chapters 12–16.
2   Also see on this point EU Chapter 8 par. 1.
3   For a discussion of the fascinating question if primary law or proposed Treaty amendments 
can ever violate (even) higher principles of EU law, and for that reason be annulled or disap-
plied see Unierecht N. Idriz-Tescan, Legal constraints on EU Member States as primary law 
makers: a case study of the proposed permanent safeguard clause on free movement of persons in 
the EU negotiating framework for Turkey’s accession (Diss. Leiden 2015, Meijersreeks;MI-247), 
or A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the General Court: the ECJ’s predicament and the 
consequences for Member States’. European Constitutional Law Review, 7, pp. 481–510.
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These acts may be challenged ‘on grounds of lack of competence, infringe-
ment of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or 
of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.’4 Especially 
considering the inclusion of the catch-all ground of ‘infringement of the 
Treaties’ this essentially means that an act can be challenged for any violation 
of EU law. This includes, for example, the use of an incorrect legal basis as dis-
cussed in EU chapter 3, or a conflict with a fundamental right. An EU act can 
only be annulled, however, where it violates a higher norm of EU law. A legis-
lative act adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, for example, can 
only be annulled for a conflict with higher norms such as a General Principle 
of EU law, the Charter, or provisions in the TEU or TFEU, but not for a conflict 
with lower rules such as delegated or implementing acts.
The most complex and contested issue under Article 263 TFEU concerns the 
three different categories of applicants that are allowed to bring an action for 
annulment, and especially the very limited standing of individuals to do so.5 As 
EAC law does not impose similar restrictions on individuals that want to bring 
an action for annulment, a detailed overview on this point would be of limited 
comparative value. Consequently, this section only gives a general overview of 
the legal complexities surrounding the standing of individuals under Article 
263 TFEU.6
The first category, the so-called privileged applicants, consists of the 
Member States, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
These applicants have a general right to start an action for annulment against 
any EU legal act, without having to prove any legal interest whatsoever.
The second category consists of the Court of Auditors, the European Central 
Bank and the Committee of the Regions. These semi-privileged applicants may 
bring an action for annulment against any EU act that affects their own pre-
rogatives. They therefore do have to establish a certain legal interest in the act 
being challenged, and must prove that this act in some way affects their own 
powers or responsibilities.
4   Article 263(2) TFEU.
5   Cf. T. Tridimas and S. Poli, ‘Locus Standi of Individuals under Article 230(4): The Return of 
Eurydice?’ in: A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout, and T. Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU law: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP, 2008), ch. 5, or S. Balthasar, ‘Locus Standi Rules 
for Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The New Article 263(4) TFEU’ (2010) 
35 ELRev, 542.
6   For the very broad standing under the EAC equivalent action see Chapter 7. For a more 
detailed analysis on standing under Article 263 TFEU see A. Ward, Judicial Review and the 
Rights of Private Parties in EU law (OUP, 2nd edn, 2007).
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The third category consists of all natural or legal persons that are not privi-
leged or semi-privileged, usually referred to as ‘individuals’. These individuals 
only have standing to bring an action for annulment against an EU act in one of 
three scenarios. To begin with, individuals can institute annulment proceed-
ings against an act specifically addressed to them. This includes for example 
companies that receive a decision from the Commission lowering a grant or 
imposing a fine for a violation of competition law. In such cases, standing will 
be easy to establish, as the parties will be identified by name in the act they 
want to challenge.
Additionally, individuals can also bring an action for annulment against an 
act that is not addressed to them if this act ‘is of direct and individual concern 
to them’. The criterion of direct concern requires that the EU act ‘directly affects 
the legal situation of the individual’ and leaves no discretion to those imple-
menting it, such as a Member State.7 It is the criterion of ‘individual’ concern, 
however, that forms the real bottleneck. In the (in)famous Plaumann ruling, 
the CJEU gave an extremely restrictive interpretation of individual concern:
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim 
to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of 
certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circum-
stances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by 
virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case 
of the person addressed. In the present case the applicant is affected 
by the disputed Decision as an importer of clementines, that is to 
say, by reason of a commercial activity which may at any time be prac-
tised by any person and is not therefore such as to distinguish the appli-
cant in relation to the contested Decision as in the case of the addressee.8
Essentially, the CJEU thereby restricts individual concern to those situa-
tions where an act is so specifically affecting a certain party that it is de facto 
addressed to it. The main test the CJEU uses for this purpose is the idea of an 
‘open group’. Whenever an act affects an ‘open group’, that is a group to which 
new members can accede, the member of this group are not individually con-
cerned, even if they can be identified very precisely. In Plaumann, for example, 
the contested act affected importers of clementines. The CJEU held that this 
7   Case C-386/96 P Dreyfus v Commission [1998] ECR I-2309, par. 43, or Joined Cases C-445/07 P 
and C-455/07 P Ente per le Ville vesuviane [2009] ECR I-7993, par. 45.
8   Case 25/62 Plaumann ECLI:EU:C:1963:17, my italics.
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is an open group, as any person may decide to become a clementine importer 
and join this group. As a result, clementine importers were not individually 
concerned, and had no standing under Article 263 TFEU. Any act, therefore, 
that affects an open group, such as a certain profession or industry, will not 
be of individual concern to the members of this group, and consequently they 
will not be able to bring an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.
The interpretation given by the CJEU in Plaumann is extremely restrictive, 
and indeed individuals almost never succeed in proving that they are individu-
ally concerned.9 Despite serious criticism that the Plaumann doctrine exces-
sively limits the legal protection of individuals, however, the CJEU has so far 
refused to soften is approach.10 The CJEU instead argued that expanding stand-
ing for individuals under Article 263 TFEU required a Treaty amendment.
With the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the standing for individuals was indeed 
somewhat extended, albeit in a rather complex way. Individuals can now 
also bring an action for annulment against ‘a regulatory act which is of direct 
concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.’ Under this 
ground, the restrictive requirement of individual concern no longer has to be 
met. In its place have come two new requirements, namely that the act is regu-
latory in nature, and does not require any implementing measures. The term 
‘regulatory act’ however, was new and was not defined anywhere in the Treaty. 
The CJEU therefore, had to provide its own definition of regulatory action 
in Inuit:
The General Court concluded, in paragraph 56 of the order under appeal, 
that ‘the meaning of “regulatory act” for the purposes of the fourth para-
graph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of gen-
eral application apart from legislative acts’. Consequently, a legislative act 
may form the subject matter of an action for annulment brought by a nat-
ural or legal person only if it is of direct and individual concern to them.11
9    For a rare example, and a nice illustration of just how specific an act needs to tar-
get a particular individual for individual concern to exist, see Case C-309/89 Codorniu 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:197.
10   For an authoritative criticism on this restrictive interpretation, as well as the refusal of 
the CJEU to change its case law, see the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in C-50/00 P 
Union de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, as well as the judgment 
of the General Court being reviewed and the General Court’s openly critical judgment in 
Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:112.
11   Case C-583/11 P Inuit ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, par. 12.
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The third possible ground of standing for individuals, therefore, only allows 
them to challenge non-legislative acts, i.e. acts that were not adopted under 
a legislative procedure, which do not require any implementation, such as for 
example some implementing regulations.12
All categories of applicants, moreover, must bring their action for annul-
ment within two months, starting from the publication of the measure. If the 
measure was not published, the time limit starts to run from either the noti-
fication to the plaintiff, or, if there was no notification or the plaintiff hears 
about the measure before notification, from the day on which the measure 
came to the knowledge of the plaintiff.
7.3 The Action for Inaction
The action for failure to act in Article 265 TFEU can be used where an EU insti-
tution, body, office has a legal obligation to act but fails to do so. Again there is a 
group of privileged applicants, consisting of the Member States, the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission and the ECB 
with unlimited standing. Individuals, on the other hand, only have limited 
standing, and can only bring an action where the body concerned should have 
addressed an act specifically to them. Before a plaintiff can start an action for 
inaction, he or she first must call on the relevant body to act.
The main difficulty for the action of inaction is to prove a sufficiently 
clear and well-defined obligation to act that can also be enforced by a Court.13 
Partially in light of this difficulty, the action for inaction is not used very 
frequently.14
12   See Article 289(3) TFEU for the concept of legislative act. For an example of a regulatory 
act that does not require implementation, see Case T-262/10 Microban ECLI:EU:T:2011:623.
13   See on this difficulty especially Case 13/83Parliament v Council (Transport Policy), 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:220.
14   For further examples see Case 4/69 Lütticke ECLI:EU:C:1971:40 or Case T-395/04 Air One 
ECLI:EU:T:2006:123.
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7.4 The Action for Damages
The action for EU liability under Article 30 TFEU should be distinguished 
from the possibility to hold Member States liable for violations of EU law.15 
Article 340 TFEU can only be used to hold EU institutions and bodies liable 
for any damages caused by them or their servants. A distinction should further 
be made between the contractual liability of the EU and the non-contractual 
liability. Contractual liability of the EU is determined by the law applicable 
to the relevant contract, and by the national civil court that has jurisdiction 
under the rules of Private International Law. Only the non-contractual liability 
of the EU for violations of EU law is determined by EU law itself.
Any party that claims to have suffered damages caused by an unlawful act 
of an EU institution or body can start an action for damages before the CJEU. 
The defendant is not the EU as such, but the institutions whose alleged unlaw-
ful act has caused the damage. Three criteria have to be met for EU liability 
to exist: 1) an illegal act by an EU institution or body, 2) actual damage, and 
3) a causal relation between the illegal act and the damage.16 The most com-
plex and restrictive criterion is the existence of an illegal act, which requires 
a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights 
on individuals. In turn, a breach is sufficiently serious where the institution 
concerned ‘manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion.’17 
Consequently, the more discretion an institution had, the more difficult it 
will be to hold it liable for any damages caused by its actions.18 This means 
that it is extremely difficult to establish liability of for instance the European 
Parliament for legislative choices made, but easier to establish liability where 
the Commission wrongly implements a very straightforward rule that leaves 
almost no discretion.19
Under Article 46 of the Statute of the Court, a time-limit of five years 
applies.20
15   On this principle see EU chapter 6 as well as Case C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR 
I-5357 and Case C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029. At the same time, 
the substantive criteria for the non-contractual liability of a Member State for violations 
of EU law are identical to the ones for EU liability. See Case C-352/98P Bergadem [2000] 
ECR I-5291.
16   Case C-352/98P Bergadem [2000] ECR I-5291.
17   Case C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029.
18   See for example Case C-472/00 P Fresh Marine ECLI:EU:C:2003:399, or for liability of the 
EU Courts themselves, case C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt ECLI:EU:C:2009:456.
19   See for example Case T-260/97 Camar ECLI:EU:T:2005:283.
20   For the details see Case C-51/05 P Cantina Sociale ECLI:EU:C:2008:409.
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7.5 The Plea of Illegality
The plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU is not an independent remedy. 
Instead, it is an argument that parties which are already in front of the CJEU 
may rely on to question the legality and validity of an EU act.21 For example, 
a farmer may bring an action for annulment against a Commission deci-
sion refusing to grant the farmer a milk-subsidy. The farmer, as addressee of 
this decision, is then allowed to start an action for annulment against this 
Commission decision under Article 263 TFEU. In the context of this annul-
ment procedure, the farmer may then rely on the plea of illegality to challenge 
another relevant EU act, such as the directive on which the Commission deci-
sion was based. After all, if the farmer can prove that the directive underly-
ing the Commission decision itself is invalid, this will also affect the validity 
of the Commission decision itself. The plea of illegality itself, however, does 
not provide a self-standing remedy.22
7.6 Infringement Proceedings
The infringement procedure is another atypical remedy that allows Member 
States or the European Commission to bring a Member State before the 
CJEU for violating its obligations under EU law.23 As it is highly exceptional 
for Member States to start infringement procedures against each other, also 
in light of the political costs, it is almost exclusively the Commission that 
starts infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU.24 Partially because 
of the reluctance of Member States to infringe each other, the independent 
and autonomous power of the Commission to start infringement proceedings 
against Member States has proven of great importance to ensure the respect 
for EU law.25
When considering the infringement procedure, it is important to realize that 
the main purpose of infringement is not to impose a penalty on the Member 
21   Joined cases 31/62 and 33/62 Wöhrmann ECLI:EU:C:1962:49.
22   See for an example Case C-11/00 Commission v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395.
23   Articles 258–260 TFEU.
24   So far, only four infringement proceedings were started by Member States against each 
other, all in situations that were already at an advanced stage of political escalation. See for 
the most recent example Case C-364/10 Hungary v. Slovak Republic ECLI:EU:C:2012:3798.
25   See in this context also the institutional responsibility of the Commission as ‘guardian’ of 
the acquis as described in EU Chapter 2.
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State. Rather, the main purpose is to ensure that EU law is applied correctly, 
preferably without having to proceed to the CJEU and asking for sanctions.26 
This main purpose is reflected in the set-up of the infringement procedure, 
which is divided into several stages.
An infringement starts with a first administrative, or pre-litigation, phase, 
in which the Commission becomes aware of a possible violation of EU law 
by a Member State.27 This can either be based on the own investigations of 
the Commission or on complaints that the Commission received.28 The 
Commission then engages in an informal dialogue with the Member State 
to further explore if EU obligations are indeed not respected, and if that is 
the case, to request the Member State to make the necessary improvements. 
If the matter is not solved during the informal dialogue, the Commission 
can decide to send a letter of formal notice. The letter contains a brief over-
view of the problems found and allows the Member State to react or make 
improvements. If the Commission is still not satisfied with the explanation or 
improvements it can decide to issue a reasoned opinion. This is an important 
step in the entire proceedings. The reasoned opinion formally has to set out 
all the complaints that the Commission has concerning the way in which the 
Member State fulfils its obligations, and must give the Member State a reason-
able period to comply.29 If the Member State does not comply, the reasoned 
opinion becomes the basis for the next phase, which is the first judicial phase. 
It has to be stressed though that at this stage over 90% of all infringements 
have been resolved, as either the Commission has been convinced that there 
is no violation of EU law or the Member State has already made the necessary 
improvements to ensure future compliance.
In the first judicial phase the Commission brings the Member State before 
the CJEU. The case before the CJEU is delineated by the reasoned opinion, 
and may for example not include any alleged violations that were not already 
26   See on this point for example Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium (University Fees), 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:40.
27   It does not matter which organ or body of the state actually violated EU law. Under EU law 
the central government is responsible for the behaviour of all public bodies, including the 
courts. The infringement, therefore, will always be addressed to the central government.
28   Where the Commission receives complaints from third parties on possible violations 
of EU law it has absolute discretion to initiate infringement proceedings or not. This 
allows the Commission to effectively use its limited resources. See Case 247/87 Star Fruit 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:58.
29   Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium (University Fees), ECLI:EU:C:1988:40, and Case 
C-304/02 Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:2005:444.
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included in the reasoned opinion.30 If the CJEU agrees with the Commission 
that the Member State has indeed failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law, 
it will render a declaratory judgment detailing the failure of the Member State 
and ordering it to bring an end to the violation.31 In this first judicial phase, 
therefore, no sanction is yet imposed on the Member State, as the main aim is 
still to ensure compliance.32
In the exceptional cases where Commission thinks the Member State is not 
complying with its obligations under EU law and the judgment of the CJEU, 
it can start the second administrative, or pre-litigation, phase of the infringe-
ment procedure.33 The Commission again starts with an informal dialogue, 
potentially followed by a letter of formal notice. In the second pre-litigation 
phase, however, no reasoned opinion is given or necessary, as the dispute is 
already clearly delineated by the judgment of the CJEU.
If the Commission is still not convinced that the Member State has fully 
complied at the end of the second pre-litigation phase, it can initiate the sec-
ond judicial phase. In this phase, the Commission may request the Court to 
impose a lump sum fine and/or a penalty payment for every day the Member 
State fails to comply. Ultimately, it is then up to the CJEU to determine if a 
sanction should be imposed and if so how severe this sanction should be. 
If sanctions are imposed, however, they can be very serious indeed, running 
into the tens of millions of euros.34 So far, Member States have always com-
plied with such penalties when imposed, but if they were not such penalties 
could probably simply be deducted from any EU subsidies the Member State 
receives from the EU.
30   Cf. Case C-350/02 Commission v Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2004:389. Also note that the CJEU 
will judge the situation in the Member State at the end of the reasoned opinion. Any 
improvements made after the time period allowed in the reasoned opinion has expired 
will therefore not be taken into consideration by the CJEU, and will not prevent a viola-
tion from being found. See already Case 167/73 Commission v France (Merchant Navy), 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:35.
31   Article 260(1) TFEU.
32   Cf. Case 128/78 Commission v United Kingdom (Tachographs), ECLI:EU:C:1979:32. See how-
ever the exceptional possibility under Article 260(3) TFEU to already impose a sanction 
in the first judicial phase if the violation at stake was a failure to notify the Commission 
on the measures taken to transpose a directive. If the infringement concerns the incor-
rect implementation of a directive itself, the normal procedure with two judicial rounds 
applies.
33   Article 260(2) TFEU.
34   See for example Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece, ECLI:EU:C:2000:356 or Case C-304/02 
Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:2005:444.
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As stated, the infringement procedure is an important instrument in the 
EU law toolbox to make sure Member States comply with their obligations 
under EU law. Even if the Commission only has a limited capacity, and hence 
has to strategically choose which infringements to choose, it still contributes 
significantly to the effectiveness of EU law and the trust in the overall system. 
Moreover, most infringement actions are already successful in the first pre-
litigation phase, meaning that they do not necessarily have to take very long or 
become litigious.35
7.7 Arbitration Before the CJEU
Under Article 272 TFEU the CJEU has jurisdiction to give a judgment based on 
any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of 
the EU. This may be in a contract governed by public or private law. In addi-
tion, Article 273 TFEU allows for CJEU jurisdiction where any dispute between 
Member States which relates to the subject matter of the Treaties is submitted 
to it under a special agreement between the parties.
So far the CJEU has not yet been active under these provisions. In recent 
years, however, the use of public international law instruments to support or 
supplement EU action, where collective action under EU law proved impos-
sible, has increased significantly. Increasingly, these fascinating hybrids of EU 
and Public International law also involve EU institutions outside the boundar-
ies of EU law proper. This includes the grants of jurisdiction to the CJEU. The 
coming years, therefore, might see some actual uses of these special heads of 
jurisdiction, which may also be of interest to the comparable heads of jurisdic-
tion enjoyed by the EACJ.36
35   Of course where disputes become extremely political, such as in the contested changes to 
the Hungarian constitution, even the infringement procedure might be limited in what it 
can achieve. See Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.
36   For such additional jurisdiction of the CJEU see especially Article 8 of the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU (Fiscal Compact), signed on 
2 March 2012 by all EU Member States except UK and the Czech Republic, as well as the 
Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Brussels, February 2 2012 T/ESM 
2012/en 1.
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7.8 Advisory Opinions of the CJEU
Article 118(11) TFEU allows the Member States, the European Parliament, 
the Council or the Commission to request an opinion of the CJEU on the 
compatibility of an envisaged international agreement with the Treaties. 
If the CJEU finds that the envisioned agreement is not compatible with the 
Treaties, the agreement may not enter into force, unless the parts that conflict 
with the Treaties are sufficiently amended. Asking an opinion is not manda-
tory. Not asking an opinion, however, runs the risk of the CJEU annulling the 
entire agreement at a later stage if conflicts with the Treaties are found. Such 
an annulment would of course create even more legal and political headaches, 
including possible liability towards the other signatories to the agreement.37
Over time, the capacity to give legal opinions has led to some of the most 
important rulings given by the CJEU, often dealing with foundational ques-
tions on the nature of the EU legal order itself, and its relation to other legal 
regimes. This also in part because legal opinions provide the CJEU with the 
opportunity to settle such questions in a relatively general manner.38 
37   See in this context the recent Opinion 2/15 of the CJEU on the trade agreement between 
the EU and Singapore, considered to be the model for CETA and TTIP.
38   See for example Opinion 2/94 Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
[2006] ECR I-929, Opinion 1/09 Patent Court [2011] ECR I-1137, or the highly contentious 
recent Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement providing for the accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
